posed tuition tax credit creates serious constitutional objections under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 4 To establish discriminatory intent, the Note adopts a standard of proof based on the foreseeable consequences of the legislation. After assessing the credit's disproportionate racial impact on schools, the Note evaluates the credit's constitutionality under the foreseeability standard and concludes that the legislation should not be reintroduced without substantial revision. The Note then suggests that Congress consider implementing a system of education vouchers as a constitutional alternative that would achieve the same goals as tax credits.
I. Legislative Background to the Proposed Tuition Tax Credit
Although tuition tax credit proposals have been adopted by the Senate with increasing frequency since the late 1960's, 5 similar legislation had continually failed to reach the floor of the House of Representatives. 6 In 1978, however, the House held its first floor debate on tuition tax credits, and subsequently adopted H.R. 12050, the Tuition Tax Credit Act of 1978, 7 which provided nonrefundable income tax credits for tuition payments made to elementary and secondary schools and to institutions of higher education. 8 The bill established a credit equal to twenty-five percent of tuition, per student, with a maximum allowable credit of $100 for primary education and $250 for higher education. 9 When the Senate considered the bill, it deleted the provision for elementary and secondary school credits. 10 The Conference Committee proposed a compromise on the inclusion of credits for secondary school 4. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes the same constitutional standard on the federal government as that applied to the states under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) . Therefore, this Note refers interchangeably to the equal protection clause and its equivalent guarantee under the due process clause.
5. The Senate has approved six education tax credit bills, all for tuition at institutions of higher education, since 1967. See 123 CONG. Rac. S18,803 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1977) The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 168, 1979 education, 1 1 but both the House and Senate rejected the proposal, and the entire credit package was recommitted in the final days of the Ninety-fifth Congress.' 2 In the current congressional session, numerous members have again introduced bills proposing tuition tax credits,' 3 but none has yet reached the floor of the House or Senate.
Sponsors of the tuition tax credit argued that the legislation would advance the fundamental values of pluralism and choice in American education.' 4 They contended that, by offering parents alternatives to public schools, tax credits would stem declining private school enrollments and thus maintain the vitality of a diverse private educational sector.' 5 Concentrating on the constitutionality of tuition tax credits under the establishment clause of the First Amendment,", opponents charged that the credit would have the constitutionally impermissible effect of advancing religion because the vast majority of nonpublic elementary and secondary schools are affiliated with religious institutions.1 7 11. See H.R. REP. No. 1790 , 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7 (1978 . 12. 124 CONG. REG. S19,144 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) ; 124 CONG. REc. at H12,612 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) . President Carter had indicated that he would veto any tuition tax credit legislation. See Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1978 , at 6, col. 2. He offered an alternative aid package, which Congress adopted, the Middle Income Student Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978 (increasing aid to middle-income families for college tuition), and the Education Amendments of 1978 , Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2143 (1978 (expanding current aid programs to nonpublic schools). Supporters of the tax credit legislation emphasized that they intend to make the credit an issue in the 1980 presidential election if it is not passed this year. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. S13,112 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff); Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 329 (statement of Sen. Moynihan). The tax credit concept for aid to nonpublic schools had been endorsed in the 1976 campaign platforms of both political parties. See 123 CONG. REC. S8054 (daily ed. May 19, 1977) (Democratic party: commitment to providing tax aid for education to ensure parental freedom of choice; Republican party: favors tax credits for elementary and secondary school tuition).
13. Forty-eight proposals for tuition tax credits are currently pending in the 96th Congress. Telephone Conversations with staff of Senate Comm. on Finance and House Comm. on Ways & Means, Sept. 25, 1979 (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
14. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REG. S13,113 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) 17. About 85% of the nation's nonpublic elementary and secondary schools are religiously affiliated. Memorandum from Attorney General Griffin Bell to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Department of Health, Education and Welfare 4 (March 17, 1978 ) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The Supreme Court has held that legislation violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment if it has no secular purpose, has the primary Tax Credits Additional challenges to tuition tax credits were advanced in order to supplement the constitutional argument. Some members of Congress emphasized the fiscal problems generated by the credit's high costs.' 8 Others voiced complaints on civil rights grounds based on the credit's segregative effect on schools. 19 They contended that the legislation would foster segregation or resegregation by facilitating the exit of middle-class white families from urban public school systems into private segregated academies. However, the opponents who expressed this concern over the credit's impact on the racial composition of the nation's schools raised only public policy, rather than constitutional, objections. 20 A more thorough evaluation of the tuition tax credit legislation under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment would have established the credit's vulnerability to an equal protection challenge and demonstrated that, as drafted, it could not constitutionally have been enacted. Church and State: Tuition Tax Credits, 92 HARv. L. R v. 696 (1979) (arguing for constitutionality of federal tuition tax credits under establishment clause).
Supporters of the tax credit distinguish Nyquist on the basis of a footnote in that case, 413 U.S. at 782-83 n.38 (suggesting statute may be permissible if broader class of beneficiaries). They noted that when elementary, secondary, and college credits are combined in one program, nonsectarian schools will receive 75% of the bill's total benefits, S. REP. No. 642, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) 
A. Development of the Foreseeability Standard of Proof
In analyzing the tax credit legislation, the standard for intent applied in school desegregation decisions provides the appropriate legal framework. The decision to enact tuition tax credits raises the same constitutional and policy issues that are raised by a school board's selection of a school site or a student assignment plan: both decisions directly In addition, in school desegregation decisions, courts had to fashion a standard for intent applicable to governmental entities whose action or inaction resulted in pronounced segregative effects without express indication of discriminatory motivation. 28 Tuition tax credits involve the same problematic combination of institutional defendant, effects and motivation. 2 9 Thus, tuition tax credit legislation and segregative school board action demand a similar judicial response.
The formulative Supreme Court decisions in school desegregation litigation developed an approach to intent that stresses the effects of school board practices; from these opinions, many lower courts extracted the theoretical basis for utilizing evidence of foreseeability to prove intent. 3 37. The Milliken Court, in effect, refused to expand its formulation of intent over time-from past to present-into geographical space-from city to suburb-which would allow for an inter-district remedy as well as an intra-district solution. See 418 U.S. at 744-45. This limitation also was reflected in the recent case of Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) . However, the Court's continued concern with effects is still apparent in its construction of a standard for relief in Dayton; it held that district courts must determine the "incremental segregative effect" of the government's violation in formulating a remedy. 433 U.S. at 420. Furthermore, application of a foresceability test for intent may lead to the same result that the Court reached in Milliken, because the segregation was not foreseeable when the boundary lines between the city and suburbs were drawn.
38 45 the Court held that proof of the foreseeable consequences of school board acts or omissions was relevant evidence for establishing discriminatory intent. 40 In addition to adopting an objective evidentiary standard for intent, the Court in these two cases upheld findings that Brown imposed an affirmative duty on school boards whose districts were actually segregated in 1954 to disestablish dual school systems. 47 Ct. 2941 Ct. , 2947 Ct. -48 (1979 . In both cases, the Court upheld findings of discriminatory intent on the part of school boards in districts that had not been segregated by law at the time desegregation was mandated by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . The lower courts had found that the boards were operating officially segregated systems in 1954 despite the absence of a legislative mandate or authorization. The Supreme Court's affirmance indicates that all systems that were racially imbalanced in 1954 through some intentional action by a school official, regardless of statutory sanction, are dual school systems within the meaning of Brown. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2946 n.5 (1979) (intentional acts sufficient to establish existence of dual systems). All southern school systems and probably most systems outside the South were segregated in this sense in 1954. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT 1959, at 166, 245, 256-60 (17 demonstrate a board's failure to fulfill its duty under Brown. 4 s These cases continued the trend toward an effects test because the concept of an affirmative duty under Brown serves to shift the triggering element of unconstitutionality away from "intent," as a specific current invidious purpose, to "effects," the continuous presence of patterns of racial imbalance that are the consequence of pre-1954 actions.
Because foreseeable impact alone is insufficient to establish intent, 4 0 additional factors, such as notice to the defendant of the effects of his actions, 50 
B. Application of Proof of Foreseeability to Legislative Bodies
Although courts in school desegregation cases were not applying the foreseeability standard to legislative decisions, the same purposes and policies underlie applicability of evidence of foreseeability to legislatures as led to its use against education authorities. Courts developed the foreseeability standard for proof of intent in order to cope with the difficulty of ascertaining the subjective intent of a multimember entity such as a school board or state educational agency. A subjective analysis of intent considers only the motivation of individual officials. 5 3 Such a standard imposes a nearly impossible evidentiary burden when applied to an institutional defendant because of the difficulty of disstandard was adopted by the Supreme Court when it rejected a presumption of intent based on foreseeable effects. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct 2971, 2978 n.9 (1979).
52. The Supreme Court's rejection of foreseeability functioning as a presumption in Dayton was based on a refusal by the Court to shift the burden of proof to the defendant and not on the nature of the evidence required for rebuttal. See 99 S. Ct. at 2978 n.9 (no warrant for holding foreseeability routinely shifts burden of persuasion). When the burden remains with the plaintiff to prove the existence of less segregative alternatives, the Court's objection is met.
When decisions result in foreseeable segregation and that outcome could easily be avoided by adopting readily available alternative programs, the inference of intentional segregation is strong. Cf. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (requiring district court to consider school board's chosen course of action "in light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness. cerning a collective will from the disparate motives of individuals and because plaintiffs rarely have access to evidence or direct knowledge of the actors' motives. 5 4 These problems are magnified when the institution under scrutiny is a state legislature or Congress, both of which are far more complex decisionmakers than an educational agency. 55 The (1978) . One writer has developed an institutional intent standard that focuses on educational objectives. See Note, supra note 52. This test charges the government with knowledge of the foreseeable consequences of alternative policies and requires the selection of the least segregative means to legitimate ends. Id. at 337-38.
Objective intent tests such as evidence of foreseeable consequences have been criticized for collapsing the Supreme Court's distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 54, at 732-33; Note, supra note 52, at 330-32. Courts applying the foreseeability standard, however, insisted that the distinction was maintained both because foreseeability required a two-step showing of the existence of a foreseeably segregative pattern and of its conscious anticipation, and because it was rebuttable. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 860 (1978) . Thus, racially disproportionate impact is used as evidence of intent under the foresecability standard, whereas in other contexts impact alone is a per se harm. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (disproportionate impact without purpose demonstrates employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Furthermore, the recent Dayton and Columbus decisions have blunted the force of this criticism of foreseeability. These decisions represent the Court's clear recognition of the crucial and valid role of objective evidence of intent in school desegregation cases. In addition, by positing a continuing, affirmative duty on school boards to desegregate without regard to direct evidence of current intent or prior statutory segregation, see note 47 supra, if the school system was segregated in 1954, the Court has cast a wide and comprehensive net over school districts that can be found in violation. Because most school districts were segregated at the time of Brown, see note 47 supra, these decisions have effectively attenuated the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation.
shifts the evidentiary focus from the thought processes of the continually changing membership of a decisionmaking body to the actions of the collective unit. This type of evidence is not only more accessible to plaintiffs than that required to prove subjective intent, 57 but also is better suited for evaluating the decisions of a multimember entity. It recognizes that institutional intent is an aggregate of all the individual purposes and thus can be calibrated only through institutional action, the sole visible expression of the unit's intent.
Judicial deference to Congress does not require adopting a standard of proof of intent for tax credits different from that applied to state school boards. The affirmative duty of school boards to desegregate relied on in Columbus and Dayton restricts the scope of permissible legislative action that affects schools. If legislators were able to pursue policies directly contravening desegregation plans, or policies whose effects indirectly did so, school boards would be frustrated in fulfilling their duty to eliminate dual schools, and court orders enforcing desegregation plans could be nullified. 58 The shift away from subjective evidence also enables a court to develop uniform guidelines and standards to govern cases, thereby avoiding the endemic empirical problems raised by a subjective mode of analysis. See Comment, supra note 54, at 733 (subjective standard precludes application of uniform standards). For example, by directing courts to look behind professed neutral motives to find segregative results, use of the foreseeability standard counteracted the dilatory, evasive tactics of school authorities. School boards and state legislatures devised "pupil placement" and "freedom of choice" plans in efforts to maintain a segregated status quo. See P. BREST, PRocEssES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 494-502 (1975) . See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 471-97 (1973) (collecting cases that illustrate techniques used to vitiate compliance with desegregation orders). Because such plans need express no explicit racial assignments, school board members might expect such plans to be upheld under a subjective standard due to the impossibility of adducing subjective evidence of their discriminatory intent. Under the foreseeability standard, however, the effects of the plan are considered along with expressed nondiscriminatory intentions. Because use of objective data allows for certainty and uniformity of judicial response, the likelihood that evasive plans will be rejected is increased.
58. 62. Although the Court shows special deference to Congress elsewhere, it has never been suggested that deference is applicable to questions of racial discrimination, particularly in the area of schools. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 41, at 13 (racially discriminatory governmental action unquestionably justifies judicial intervention). The Court has found "unthinkable" the proposition that racial discrimination becomes any more tolerable when it originates with Congress. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) . Furthermore, the Court, using strict scrutiny, has consistently invalidated facially neutral legislative classifications that masked invidious racial discrimination. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating city charter prohibiting any ordinance dealing with racial discrimination in housing); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating state constitution prohibiting state interference in any personal arrangements to buy or sell real property). In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny and extend Hunter v. Erickson to a state constitution's wealth classification that prohibited construction of low-income housing without a referendum. Tuition tax credits should not be viewed as creating wealth classifications. As the Note argues, the credit's specific educational goals are so closely related to existing school segregation that, as in Reitman v. Mulkey, the legislation, although facially neutral, is better viewed as distinguishing between taxpayers on the basis of race. Moreover, the Note contends that with careful revision the tax credit would avoid its segregative impact and thereby could validly be enacted despite its implications of distinctions based on wealth. for Green because abundance of evidence supports Green theory that segregated educational facilities contravene public policy). In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court deferred to state taxing policies that resulted in unequal funding of public school districts and held that strict judicial scrutiny was not necessary. The decision offers no precedent for deference to a legislative judgment concerning private school financing by tax credits. Rodriguez arose in the context of a longestablished local tax policy as to the sources of public school financing. 411 U.S. at 40-44, 53-54. The tuition tax credit, by contrast, is novel federal legislation that will have a broad impact on national education policies. Moreover, Rodriguez was not decided on the basis of racial discrimination, but rather involved allegations as to wealth discrimination, id. at 18-29, and violations of a fundamental interest in education, id. at 29-39. The public policy tax cases demonstrate that courts do not defer to tax statutes when racial discrimination is involved. See (1971) . The tuition tax credit therefore demands the strict scrutiny accorded state programs for private school aid, see notes 63-65 supra (discussing cases), and not the deference accorded to tax programs in Rodriguez.
Moreover, this Note ultimately evaluates the tax credit as legislation formulating educa-
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 168, 1979 The affirmative duty of Columbus and Dayton operates so as to impose a correlative duty on legislators not to inhibit school board desegregation programs, at least until dual school systems are completely eradicated. 70 Consideration of the effects of legislative proposals on school desegregation would satisfy the legislative obligation to refrain from impinging on the elimination of dual school systems. If evidence of foreseeably segregative consequences was not utilized to evaluate congressional intent, it would lead to an anomalous result: federal legislation could undermine Court decisions implementing the mandate of Brown, yet state legislation with equivalent effects could not. 71 By holding legislatures responsible for the anticipated effects of tion policy and not tax policy. See note 72 infra (establishing limits on foreseeability as applied to Congress). Thus it does not raise the specter of judicial invalidation of all tax laws under the equal protection clause, which concerned the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (impact test would require invalidation of whole range of tax and welfare statutes).
70. The fact that a legislature may have had no institutional nexus with active school discrimination in 1954, whereas a school board presumably has institutional continuity and thereby is linked to 1954, cannot enter into the Court's calculus of affirmative duty, because such a distinction would undermine any judicial ability to enforce the mandate of Brown. See note 48 supra (suggesting use of foreseeability independent from finding of continuing duty). If the duty of Brown was fulfilled, and a former dual school system was truly disestablished, then a different approach to legislative responsibility toward school desegregation from that adopted by this Note might be justified. While constructing a legislative duty "not to resegregate" might be possible, it is beyond the scope of this Note; given the currently remote possibility of achieving such a system, see pp. 184-85 infra (discussing racial composition of enrollment patterns), it is unnecessary to be concerned about legislation enacted under conditions of complete disestablishment.
71. See pp. 179-80 supra (state legislation impeding desegregation invalidated). In this respect, Brown's prohibition of segregated schools imposes limits on the extent to which Congress can pursue pluralism as a permissible goal in educational policy. Cf. p. 186 infra (one purpose of tax credit is to further educational pluralism).
Parallel treatment between the federal and state governments is strengthened by the fact that Congress has taken an increasingly active role in education, which was traditionally considered solely within the realm of local government. further whether Congress had notice of the segregative impact and whether any reasonable alternative policy with a less segregative effect can meet the congressional objectives that underlie enactment of a credit.
72.
As the foreseeability standard is developed and defined within the area of education, the scope of its applicability to congressional decisions should be limited to those actions that have a direct educational objective. General economic and social legislation only indirectly affect schools, cf. J. CooNs, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 7 (1970) (discrimination in education is direct, anticipated consequence of government action whereas slum housing, illness, malnutrition, and other aspects of poverty are not), and thus need not be invalidated by adopting this standard. Moreover, foreseeability was expansively used in the school desegregation cases and generally has not been applied successfully in other equal protection areas. Cf. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979) (upholding veteran's preference despite evidence of foreseeable consequences adverse to women). The use of foreseeability in the Dayton and Columbus school desegregation cases was considered by the Court to be in accord with Feeney. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 Ct. , 2950 Ct. (1979 .
Congress could, of course, expand the limited scope of the foreseeability standard by requiring consideration of the social impact of any tax legislation on segregation in schools. 
A. The Credit's Foreseeable Impact and Congressional Intent
The legislation's context-the current trend to racially isolated school systems evidenced by enrollment patterns in public and private schools -must first be examined in order to assess the seriousness of the credit's impact on schools. Congressional action that may foster such a tendency should be evaluated with the recognition that present levels of school desegregation do not yet even approach fulfilling the promise of Brown.
Current Trends in Student Enrollments
Public school enrollment patterns currently manifest an increasing concentration of black students and a reciprocal decline in the number of white students in the largest school districts. 74 Desegregation gains in recent years have occurred primarily in the South and in smaller school districts. 75 In every region outside the South, most black students attend schools with minority enrollments of approximately seventy-five percent.
7 6 Even in the South, the impact of court-ordered desegregation has been reduced by the proliferation of segregationist private schools that offer a haven for white parents seeking to avoid integration The continuing and growing presence of segregationist academies demonstrates how private schools may be used to blunt attempts to integrate public school systems. Overtly segregationist schools, however, are only part of the larger problem of an inability to effectively integrate the private educational sector voluntarily. Although black children represent almost sixteen percent of the total school-age population, 7 8 they comprise only five percent of the total private school enrollment3 9 Thus their presence in private schools has, at best, a negligible effect on the student body in the private sector.
The confluence of these public school enrollment trends and the racial composition of private schools creates a dual national educational system of predominantly black urban public schools and predominantly white private and suburban public schools. 8 0 Fulfillment of the duty that Brown imposed on school boards to desegregate is severely threatened by these attendance patterns. This evidence of a national dual school system provides the critical backdrop for analyzing the credit's foreseeable impact.
Establishing Discriminatory Intent
The primary beneficiaries of the proposed tuition tax credit are middle-and upper-income families. EDUCATION 1977 EDUCATION , at 190, 192 (1977 . 80. Cf. RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 47, at 31 ("Private and parochial school enrollment, which is overwhelmingly white, also is a significant factor in the increasing separation of white and Negro school children.") (footnote omitted).
81. Seventy-five percent of the benefits of the tax credit would have gone to families with annual incomes over $15,000; only 9% of the benefits would have gone to families with incomes under $10,000 and 16% would have gone to families with incomes between $10,000 and $15,000. 124 CONG. REC. S13,122 (daily ed. Aug. underrepresented in these income groups, 82 a higher percentage of white than black families will be likely to use the credit. Because the tax credit will therefore maintain or even accelerate the current systemic pattern of segregation in educational enrollments, it has a disproportionate racial impact on schools. The foreseeability of these results is evident from the structure of the bill. The express purposes of the credit were to further parental freedom of choice and pluralism in education while providing tax relief for the double educational expenses of middle-income parents. 83 The credit was explicitly intended to function as an incentive device for the use of alternative nonpublic educational systems. 8 4 In congressional debate, speakers predicted that taxpayers would use the credit to shift their children from public to private schools, or to meet the escalating 82. Median income for black families in 1977 was $9,485, compared to a median income of $16,782 for white families. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 457 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS]. Thus, most black families are in the income groups that receive a total of 9% of the expected benefits of the credit. See note 81 supra (discussing breakdown of benefits). Only 10.8% of all nonwhite families have incomes of $25,000 or more, as compared to 23.9% of all white families. CENSUS, supra, at 452. These higher income groups receive more than onethird of the credit's benefits. See Estimates, supra note 81. The racial skew of the benefits is aggravated by the nonrefundable nature of the credit. See p. 188 infra (proposing refundability as remedy for segregative effect).
Although one commentator has testified that the credit will enable poorer families to attend nonpublic schools and thereby increase minority enrollment in the private sector, see Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 162-70 (statement of Thomas Vitullo-Martin), there is no data to indicate that low-income families will be more likely than wealthier families to take advantage of the credit.
The skewing of benefits to middle-and upper-income groups by the tax credit would, in fact, produce the worst kind of "integration" in school systems-one based on homogeneous student wealth levels. Children of affluent families will be classmates in private schools and only the children of lower income groups will remain as classmates in public schools. Research has suggested that the more significant factor in the academic achievement of black children attending integrated schools is not the racial balance of the classroom itself, but rather the socio-economic status of the child's family and classmates. See J. COLEMAN Er AL., supra note 47, at 302, 325; cf. J. BURKHEAD, INPUT AND OUTPUT IN LARGE-CITY HIGH SCHOOLS 88 (1967) (most important finding in study is that variations in educational outcomes as measured by test scores wholly conditioned by socio-economic environment of neighborhood). The tax credit's effect of furthering socio-economic class stratification clearly would vitiate the benefits to be derived from public school desegregation. 1976, 1976-3 C.B. 177 (vol. 2) (movie and TV film investment credit is "further incentive to encourage U.S. production"); [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1928-29 (to achieve goal of congressional work incentive program of employing welfare recipients, credit adopted as "specific tax incentive for employers who hire individuals under . . . program").
costs of maintaining their children in private schools. 85 Congress thus readily foresaw the very mechanism of the credit's segregative impact: providing economic subsidies for continued attendance in, and transfer to, nonpublic schools.
In addition, the structure of the bill's benefits evidences an awareness that by limiting the legislation's subsidy to higher income groups, the credit disproportionately favored the movement of whites out of the increasingly black public schools and into the overwhelmingly white private system. 86 Furthermore, several members of Congress recognized the potential segregative impact of the credit in the debate over the billyt This chain of inferences firmly establishes not only that the credit's segregative effect was reasonably foreseeable, but also that Congress had notice of that consequence. Enactment despite the warning of the bill's segregative effect supplies strong evidence of impermissible intent.
Discriminatory intent would be established if, in addition to this evidence of foreseeably segregative impact and congressional notice of that effect, it was demonstrated that there were available possible revisions or alternative programs that would mitigate the segregative effect of the tax credit legislation and still fulfill the objectives of educational pluralism and tax relief. 88 In fact, several such alternative proposals were available to Congress. These alternatives are broadly distinguishable on the basis of the focus of revision: an individualrecipient approach that would redefine the income beneficiary class 85. See, e.g., note 86 infra (quoting Sen. Stafford); 124 CONG. Rac. H4735 (daily ed. June 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Frenzel) ("We simply believe those parents who are willing to make a particular sacrifice ought to get a little encouragement so that they can continue to do so.") 86. This was explicitly noted by Senator Stafford:
To the extent that we create an incentive for parents to move their children to private schools, the resulting action would involve whites very disproportionately.... I am wary that tax credits will tend to be resegregative in their effect. It would be very inconsistent of our Government to demand public school integration in the pursuit of equal opportunity and at the same time create financial incentives to any degree which would work against that objective. . . . We have some excellent recent data .... which provide some perspective on these considerations. One-fourth of the children from families with incomes above $50,000 were in private schools, as were 17 percent of all children from families with incomes above $25,000, but only 4 percent of all children from families with incomes below $5,000. While 17 percent of all white children attend private schools, only 5 percent of all minority children do. 124 CONG. Rac. S13,124 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) and an institutional approach that would restrict the range of private schools at which taxpayers could use the credit. Two suggestions for restructuring the credit by redefining the beneficiary class have been proposed: refundable credits and income ceilings.
8 9 A refundable credit provides that when a taxpayer's liability is less than the amount that he would be entitled to as a credit, he receives the difference as a cash refund. Income ceilings limit eligibility for claiming a credit to taxpayers whose adjusted gross incomes are below a determined level. These provisions would reduce the credit's present tendency to skew benefits toward higher income families. They would allow for greater participation by black families, who are more heavily represented among low-income groups, and thus would tend to lessen the legislation's segregative effect. A credit that progressively increased in amount in inverse correlation to income level would have a similar effect.
In addition to provisions focusing on the recipients, restrictions might be placed on institutional eligibility. The legislation itself required the taxpayer to attend a school that qualifies for tax-exempt status. 90 The drafters hoped to thereby exclude families utilizing segregationist academies because such schools cannot receive tax exemptions. REc. S13,201 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1978) ; see note 82 supra (discussing effect of nonrefundability on low-income taxpayers). Senator Metzenbaum introduced an amendment to phase out the credit as adjusted gross income exceeds $30,000 but the amendment was defeated. See 124 CONG. REC. S13, 359-63 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978 effectively monitor institutional compliance with regulations requiring nondiscriminatory admissions policies for tax-exempt status. 9 2 Moreover, an individuated institutional remedy would not lessen the credit's segregative impact on the nation's increasingly dual educational structure. Thus, the effectiveness of the current legislation's institutional method to reduce the credit's segregative effect is negligible.
It is possible, however, to readily formulate other, more effective institutional eligibility restrictions. Taxpayer use of credits could be limited to schools with a specified minimum proportion of minority students. 9 3 This ratio could be determined by either a uniformly re- This problem of public funding restrictions and the conflict between First Amendment associational rights and the Fourteenth Amendment is solved in the case law by the revocation of the benefit accorded the particular institution. This would be too narrow a remedy to resolve the segregative effect of tuition tax credits. The constitutional danger lies not only in the discriminatory policies of individual schools but also in the broader impact of the tax credit program on nationwide patterns of attendance in public versus nonpublic schools. REG. 37,296 (Aug. 22, 1978) (hearings held week of Dec. 5, 1978) . Unless a private school could meet various good-faith criteria, these guidelines would have denied it exempt status if it (1) opened simultaneously with the desegregation of local public schools and (2) enrolled a percentage of minority students less than 20% of their proportion in the community. This proposal drew such vigorous protest that the IRS subsequently modified it. Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 44 FED. REG. 9451 (Feb. 13, 1979) S. 265 (1978) (certain special minority admissions programs in professional schools unconstitutional). Bakke can be distinguished from guidelines limiting institutional eligibility for tax credits by the nature of the "good" involved. Admission to institutions of higher education, and particularly professional schools, allocates a scarce commodity. Thus, quired percentage of minority students or a percentage keyed to minority representation within the school's adjacent community.
4
These restricted credits would minimize the possibility of a segregative effect by allowing the subsidy for private school attendance to be used only at schools that countered the current trend to racial isolation in public and private schools.
Institutional eligibility rules would provide more direct assurance that the credit would not be transformed into a device to avoid integration than would tinkering with individual taxpayer eligibility; institutional restrictions are more easily enforced than controls on individuals. Moreover, although both recipient and institutional adjustments reduce the credit's segregative effect, a combination of the two would be a more effective safeguard against segregation than either method taken separately.
5 Combination would ensure both greater individual participation by black families and continuing institutional efforts to maintain integrated enrollments. Congress also could restructure the incentive feature of the tax credit to minimize the current trend toward a national dual school system. The amount of the credit could be scaled to increase if the taxpayer's child attends a school where he is in the racial minority, or if he attends a school with a specified minimum level of minority enrollment.", Such an incentive system would enhance the attainment of the existing congressional goals: it both preserves individual educational choice and provides tax relief, while including a financial bonus for attending integrated schools. The incentive function of the credit would thus the Court viewed the racial classification in Bakke as a racial preference limiting equality of educational opportunity. 95. Nor would individual freedom of choice and a measure of tax relief be impaired by these refinements to the legislation. The restrictions on institutional eligibility may infringe on the congressional goal of freedom of educational choice, but they would do so only within the mandate of Brown, which limits the permissibility of pluralism as a legitimate goal, see note 71 supra. Income ceilings would impinge on the congressional goal of middle-class tax relief only where the ceiling was drawn at a low income level. In such a case, alternative methods of tax relief that did not directly affect education could be utilized to aid the middle-class family. A mix of the two alternatives, institutional and income-beneficiary restrictions, thus maximizes sensitivity to congressional goals while minimizing segregative effects.
96. See J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 126-27 (suggesting dollar incentives for voucher plan). shift dramatically; rather than foster segregation, it would encourage desegregation.
Any combination of these revisions, or any one of them alone, would result in a credit less segregative than the current proposal. The availability of alternatives, in conjunction with the inference drawn from the credit's foreseeable consequences and congressional notice of the segregative effect, establishes discriminatory intent. Because the current legislation would be unconstitutional under this analysis, any reconsideration of the tuition tax credit would require modification to incorporate some mix of these less segregative alternatives.
B. A Constitutional Alternative to Tax Credits
There is a danger-perhaps even a likelihood-that schools will remain segregated even under a revised credit program. Given the disparity between the value of the credit and the cost of private education, and given the existence of free public schools, lower income groups-which include most black families-might well be unable to shift into private school systems. The heavy concentration of black children in public school systems would remain substantially unchanged. For this reason, alternatives that could replace tax credits entirely should be explored.
Federal grants to assist in implementing local educational voucher systems offer one constitutional alternative to tax credits. 9 8 A voucher system gives all parents a cash grant, or voucher, linked to the local per-pupil cost of education, which parents then use to purchase education at any school of their choice. 99 Such a system would meet the pluralist and desegregationist goals underlying the revised tax credit scheme and yet be superior to a credit; by equalizing the per-pupil state 97. Evidence of the existence of still less segregative alternatives does not automatically void a particular legislative choice; Congress need not choose the least segregative proposal if it would not serve the specific goals of the original program. Thus, Congress need not adopt the proposed "restructured incentive" credit in order to encourage school desegregation because the original goals of the credit were solely to promote tax relief and educational pluralism. Because institutional restrictions clearly would be more effective than individual recipient restrictions in reducing segregative effects, the intent criterion of availability of alternatives would mandate congressional adoption of the institutional restrictions; it would not, however, require the additional incorporation of individual restrictions in the overall plan.
98. Congress has approved pilot voucher programs that were carried out under the auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The most famous of these was the program in Alum Rock, California, in which only public schools participated. See E. COHN Vouchers would thereby satisfy the congressional concern for tax relief from the double expenditures of paying taxes to support public schools while paying tuition to attend private schools.
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In the public controversy over educational alternatives, voucher plans were proposed by commentators representing a wide range of political views.' 0 3 To be constitutionally acceptable, however, the voucher system, like the modified tax credit proposals, would require participating institutions to observe minimum minority enrollment requirements. 0 4 Moreover, financial bonuses to parents for their children's attendance at integrated schools should be an integral component of a voucher program. 104. See J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 126 (suggesting minority enrollment percentage requirements for voucher schools); IRS Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, supra note 92 (20% minority representation in community requirement for receiving tax exemption). Coons and Sugarman add a third technique to limit segregation in addition to financial bonuses and the rule mandating a minimum percentage minority enrollment or disqualification for nonintegration: a rule that schools must admit every applicant or use a lottery where too many applicants apply for admission. See J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 125-26. But cf. Coleman, Introduction to id. at xiv (expressing hesitation as to efficacy of Coons & Sugarman's systemic safeguards against segregation and stressing need for stronger constraints or incentives).
105. See J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 94, at 126-27 (suggesting use of "integration bonuses" and financial penalties to stimulate "racial mixing" in voucher schools). school systems, vouchers could affirmatively address the problem of segregative patterns within public schools and between public and nonpublic schools. The amount of the voucher must constitute a ceiling on tuition rates that participating schools could charge in order to make the voucher system effective; otherwise, segregative patterns would reemerge in the system. 106 Moreover, attendance patterns determined by residential segregation could be countered by a voucher system using a magnet school program. In such a program, school districts participating in the voucher plan would replace neighborhood schools with magnet schools that offered specialized programs and covered wider geographical attendance zones than that of the neighborhood., 0 7 Transportation costs would have to be subsidized by the plan to ensure that magnet schools were available to all students. 08 Under a voucher system, students would no longer be confined to segregated neighborhood schools because the income-restrictive feature of tax credits would be eliminated, as would assignment by residence. A carefully structured voucher plan could thereby hasten achievement of truly desegregated school systems. Because vouchers fulfill the same objectives as tax credits but with foreseeably less segregative effect, Congress, in formulating national educational policy, should focus on the feasibility of implementing a voucher system rather than a revised tax credit scheme.
106. Cf. id. at 190-91 (suggesting tuition limit). If there were no tuition ceiling, wealthier families could supplement the voucher and send their children to more expensive schools while poorer families would be forced to use the cheapest schools. This would result in an economically stratified system that would offer a negligible opportunity for integration, given the congruence of race and wealth, see notes 81 & 82 supra, as existing enrollment patterns demonstrate. Imposition of a ceiling would undoubtedly result in some existing exclusive private schools choosing not to participate in the voucher system so as to charge higher rates, but in that case, those schools and their users would receive no public funding. Additionally, a new educational market would have been created by the voucher system, and former users of those schools would be able to shift to other institutions. See Areen, supra note 2, at 475 (discussing voucher plan tuition limits).
107. Adopting a magnet school program under a tax credit system, however, would not have much impact on segregation levels. Because tax credits leave intact the separation between public and private schools, the magnet school program would only affect those children choosing to remain in the public system who did not use the credit.
108. See E. COHN, sutra note 71, at 305 (suggesting free or subsidized transportation in voucher plan). If costs were not subsidized, there would be no real free choice in the voucher system and poorer black students would be restricted to existing segregated neighborhood schools. The purpose of adopting the magnet school plan would thereby be frustrated.
